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DISCUSSION - SESSION ONE
The comments made by the speakers are their own personal remarks and do not
necessarily represent the official view of any organization or agency they represent.
MR. MARK KAHN: Regarding the problem of jurisdiction in Professor Kroner's
paper, so ably summarized just now, I would like to mention that I recently had
a most interesting experience serving as a referee on an ad hoc seven-man board
of adjustment: Two people named by the Air Line Pilots Association, two people
named by the Flight Engineers International Association and two people appointed
by Pan American. All three parties joined in giving jurisdiction to this "special
board of adjustment" under a three-way agreement among them. After being
unable to figure out any other method for casting votes, given the composition
of the board, they decided (perhaps reluctantly) that the referee would have the
sole vote. Now, this board did function as a board, and in this extremely complex
case I benefited greatly from our two executive sessions. This benefit reflected
the high quality of the partisan appointees to this board. I have no opinion on
whether the award is immune to challenge. I will leave that to my attorney
colleagues. But there is here, I think, an example of a situation where all three
parties recognized the desirability of one final disposition of the problem. Just one
other comment at this time. John Hill misunderstood me if he thought I said that
most airline grievance cases go to arbitration. I did not mean that at all. I simply
meant that there has been a tendency for more cases to go to arbitration than
ought to go to arbitration. The data I have seen indicate this. About 250 arbi-
trations took place in the airline industry, according to an Air Transport Asso-
ciation estimate for the year 1963. Do we have later data, John?
MR. JOHN HILL: No.
MR. KAHN: At GM, which is an extreme case, one one-hundredth of one per-
cent of the written grievances initiated in 1968 went to the GM-UAW umpire.
The parties are really the only ones who can determine to what extent the griev-
ance procedure can be reshaped to keep us "outsiders" as much as possible from
messing up your affairs.
MR. ASHER SCHWARTZ: Mark Kahn asked for the use of standard forms, and
I really think that is completely unnecessary. I have seen it at work in the air-
lines and I find that the result is that the use of the forms in the hands of lay-
men makes the proceedings far more technical than the old English common law
procedures. They get all tied up in technicalities, which is just silly and wastes a
lot of time. Ultimately an arbitrator forgets about these technicalities and de-
cides the issue on its merits, but I think it is diverting the attention of the parties
when we use forms like that. My own experience in non-airline disputes and non-
railroad disputes is that we get along beautifully simply by sending a simple
letter stating in a couple of sentences that we have a grievance concerning such
and such, and we would like to have a hearing before an arbitrator. Then we go
about selecting an arbitrator. When we get to the arbitrator, we tell him in more
detail just what the dispute is about. It is more expeditious, it is less costly and I
think it results in a fairer disposition. Mark talked about the cost of the board.
I did not mention it because I think that it is something that has to be borne.
But the fact is that from a union point of view, boards of adjustment cost an
awful lot of money. There is lost-time payment to the members of the board and to
witnesses as well as the cost of counsel. There is travel for counsel and some
of the non-employee participants. And it means travel to a central point where
the board sits. So many of these cases do not warrant, from an economic point
of view, the submission to that kind of cost which is, of course, unjust to the
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grievant if he has a legitimate grievance. John Hill touched on a point which I
might have elaborated on before if I had had the time. He believed that the
attributes of the Chicago River case to which I pointed were broader than is
true. The Chicago River case does not preclude a union from making demands
which amount to demands for changes as to which dispute would be a major
dispute, subject to the procedures of the Railway Labor Act. The fact is that
the distinction between a major dispute and a minor dispute is a very difficult
one to make. I have not seen it made constructively in any decision. I know
what the words of the judges are, but when you apply them you find, at least
from where I sit, that if the employer causes, or to put it the other way, if the
union proposes something that is different from what the agreement says or if
there's nothing in the agreement about it, then the carrier's refusal to comply
with the union's request constitutes a major dispute. The status quo must be
maintained without any change until a "section 6 notice" is served and the various
procedures of mediation under the Railroad Labor Act have been followed, which
can take months or even years. In the meantime, there is no change. On the other
hand, if the carrier makes a change in the same connection and the union says,
"That isn't what the contract says" or "there isn't anything in the contract about
it," the carrier's reply is: "We have the right to do it if it's not in the contract,
management's perogative gives us that right." "If you say that the contract says
that we can't do it then you're posing a question of the interpretation of the
contract, and that's a minor dispute. So you've got to present a grievance." In
the meantime the change which the carrier makes goes into effect. And it re-
mains in effect pending the grievance procedure which also can take a year or two.
I don't know precisely what the answer is and maybe there is not any. John
Hill suggests management does have to make some decisions. But I did suggest
toward the end of my remarks that if the result creates a real and honest inequity
and the delay is costly to the employees, I think that either by voluntary action
between the parties, or, if it cannot happen voluntarily, at the request of counsel
equitable treatment would require that the court determine whether or not the
status quo should be maintained. It may well be that in many cases it should not
be maintained. But as John Hill points out, some of the courts have said that in
no case will they maintain the status quo--except for the Second Circuit in the
Westchester Lodge case which I think is a correct one. Some day, of course, the
Supreme Court will have to rule on that. Professor Kroner talked about juris-
dictional disputes. I did not think that was going to be a subject, but I just have
to make this remark. He talked about the Telegrapher's decision and then referred
to the disputes between ALPA and FEIA concerning flight engineers. I just want
to bring to your attention that the Telegrapher's decision was a question of work
jurisdiction; that is, the employees of the railroad represented by one union
wanted to take work or have work assigned to them which was being performed
by other employees of the same railroad represented by another union. Furthermore,
the Telegrapher's case was within the jurisdiction of the National Railroad Ad-
justment Board which, as you know, has members on it who are designated by
all the unions concerned. In the ALPA-FEIA case you do not have a National
Railroad Adjustment Board; you have separate system boards appointed by the
carriers and the unions separately. Furthermore, it was really a question as to
who would represent the flight engineers' position. That is what it ultimately came
down to because while the pilots (ALPA) did contend initially that the flight
engineer's job ought to be performed by a pilot, they soon agreed that what they
really wanted was pilot qualifications and therefore, if the flight engineers who
were then working for the airline had pilot qualifications they would be satisfied
that they were qualified to sit in the seat. When a settlement was reached whereby
the flight engineers did obtain pilot qualifications, there was no question of work
jurisdiction. The only question that was left was one of representation, which
was decided in an entirely different forum altogether.
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MR. KAHN: I have one short comment on this business of the standard form.
As an arbitrator, I could not care less, at the time the case comes to me, whether
the original grievance was on a standard form. I like to have a clear submission
so that I know what the issues are that have to be decided, but even this is not
necessary because they can be identified at the hearing. If I understood Asher
correctly, the letter he described was the one he writes when he asks for arbitration
after the prior grievance procedure has been exhausted. I think the standard form
is an educational device in which the grievant explains: "On a particular date, when
I was doing my job in this classification and the foreman assigned me to do some-
thing rather specific, I claim that he was asking me to perform an assignment
outside the scope of my job and I want this cleared up." Now that kind of
specific statement of what happened-where, when, who did what to the grievant
-helps to get the grievance procedure off to a good start and makes it more likely
that the matter will be settled in the lower steps. That's the point I had in mind.
MR. ARTHUR WISEHART: I would like to make a general comment to the panel
members at large. It seems to me, after hearing a number of very excellent papers,
that one aspect may have been over-simplified. And that is the question of delay
in adjustment board proceedings. As John Hill correctly pointed out, the extent
of delay varies from carrier to carrier and depends upon the particular procedures
that may be followed in individual cases. But I feel that the so-called problem
that has been alluded to by most of the panel members has been exaggerated.
Of course, justice delayed may be justice denied. However, in assessing responsi-
bility, it is important to recognize that in the typical grievance case it is the union
that is the moving party and has almost complete control over the speed with
which that case progresses through the procedure. This is exemplified by the
provisions in a couple of contracts American Airlines has. One is with the
Stewardesses Union and the other is with the Transport Workers Union. In them
the question of expedited hearings is directly referred to, and it's indicated in
the contracts that in a case which the union regards to be of sufficient urgency,
a hearing can be brought on in fifteen days at its request. Thus, in those cases
where there is a matter of great interest in expediting the hearing, it can be
brought on. I happen to feel rather strongly about this point because we were in
the anomalous position of having been sued by a union, recently, in a case alleging
that the company had inordinately delayed the handling and processing of the
grievances and that equitable relief should be granted. The fact of the matter
was that the grievances were pending but the union failed to process them ex-
peditiously. The company did not like to be sued and it did not like to be
charged with an inordinate delay, and it was doing everything possible to expedite
the handling of those grievances. But since the union was the moving party they
could not be brought on-apparently for policy or strategy reasons-more quickly.
On the one hand, the attorney involved was arguing in court that the company
was delaying things, and on the other hand, he was handling the grievances and
did not take the steps necessary in our view to expedite them, even though actively
encouraged to do so. Finally, I simply want to say that I think the record on
grievance handling in the airline industry in general will compare favorably with
the record on the railroads, as has been pointed out, or in the courts or generally
in administrative proceedings.
MR. KAHN: I think the airlines, of course, have some special problems and
characteristics. But I do not think the speed with which grievances are handled
on the airlines compares favorably with many non-transportation industry griev-
ance procedures.
MR. SCHWARTZ: I think Art is being a little unduly defensive here. In the first
place I do not deny that unions at times are as responsible for delays as manage-
ment may be. My criticism is of the system and of the procedures, whether it's
union or management. However, the union has a greater interest in speedier dis-
position than management does because so long as there is no disposition, man-
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agement's decisions are being carried out. However, I do not agree with Arthur
that simply because the union has the initiative and can make the moves that,
therefore, it is responsible for the delays. This just is not so. While it could
initiate a grievance, there are all kinds of structural reasons or obstacles to-
ward the final outcome. Most of these obstacles arise out of the procedures of
the Act. We have problems of getting the parties together, getting the members
of the board, particularly in the airline industry, and getting the flight crews.
They are traveling all over the country and sometimes all over the world and
some time has to be allotted to getting them all together at one time. They have
other commitments to keep. The union, the carrier, the carrier's counsel and the
carrier's witnesses have other commitments. Neutrals have to be selected and they
do not always agree right away on whom the neutrals shall be, and if the Na-
tional Mediation Board is required to select a neutral, that frequently takes months.
And after the neutral is selected, then the neutral has to fix a date that's con-
venient to him and he has other commitments. This is what causes the delay. I do
not say that it is only the carrier's responsibility, but I do think that a change
in this procedure, eliminating the Board and having a single neutral and having
it get to him more quickly, will help alot toward resolving this problem.
MR. HILL: I think that Arthur may be right that there has been over-emphasis
on the quality of the performance. Time doesn't permit the classifications and
variations. We are dealing now with averages. I was careful, I thought, to point
out that the record reported from nine front carriers ran from three to fifteen
months. I thought I was careful to point out that those at the lower end were
doing a darn good job. I said and I mean that those who are taking an average
of fifteen months are doing a poor job. I do not believe you have to be sensitive
about that. Remember we are dealing in averages and thus when you say fifteen
months it means that there are some cases that take more than fifteen months.
I believe that is inexcusable. I do agree with Asher in this respect that many of
the delays are attributable to unions. Now I told this to a union representative
at the recess, and he said he could not believe me. He said it is in the unions'
interest to expedite them and I agree with him, but neverthelss, th unions do
cause the delay. I saw a case yesterday scheduled for hearing in April of a man
discharged in October, 1967. It made me ill. Now it so happens that I checked
and a carrier has been trying to get the hearing scheduled but the unions have
refused to do it due to the backlog of cases. But again you are dealing with one
union-one bargaining union on one airline. I am familiar with that fifteen day
clause that is contained in the American Stewardess Agreement. I have seen it
invoked and I have yet to see a hearing held within fifteen days. There are two
things wrong with it. In the first place fifteen days is unrealistic-30 or 45 days
is more appropriate when you're dealing with something with an operation that
is nationwide. In the second place, what if you invoke it and the stewardesses in
the case Arthur mentioned, and the carrier say that they cannot be there because
their members are out of town. Fifteen days is quite short. I will say this in behalf
of it. I have seen the requesting party get a hearing sooner, but I do not believe
that answers the one that I mentioned this morning where there has to be a
provision where one party can get a hearing within a reasonable period of time
no matter how much foot dragging the other party engages in-you have an
outside agency do it. They are doing it in other industries with respect to dis-
putes under the "no strike' clauses, however, in that case they are getting hearings
in 12 hours. Even though that is not applicable here I do think that we have to
keep it in balance. There are good examples in the airline industry and there are
bad ones. For example, I think on United Air Lines there is a four-man board
that I would match with any board in the country. But so long as those members
are on there its fine-if they are taken off, it may turn into just another device
with which the members hear a case then automatically deadlock.
MR. HERBERT LEvy: I see that the unions at this point are down two to one
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on the question of who is responsible for the delay in grievance proceedings, but
I am not going to deadlock that question. I would like to make reference to an-
other subject that has, I think, been completely omitted this morning even
though it falls within the program of this morning's proceedings. That issue is
system boards and grievance procedures in the airline industry. But I think all
the discussion thus far has been confined to system boards and grievance pro-
cedures in that segment of the airline industry which involves represented em-
ployees. I think it is appropriate to discuss for a moment, unrepresented employees
and where they fit into this picture, because section 204 of the Act, as we know,
provides that: "It shall be the duty of every carrier and its employees acting
through their representatives to establish an adjustment board." And we all know
there are many thousands of employees in this industry who have no union repre-
sentation and therefore, no access to adjustment boards for the adjustment of their
grievances. I have several questions to raise with respect to this problem. First
of all, I would like to know whether, in the opinion of the panel, this is the
situation that was contemplated by Congress when it enacted the statute; namely,
that the provisions of section 204 should operate only in favor of unionized em-
ployees leaving unrepresented employees without a grievance adjustment pro-
cedure. I would also like to ask whether this void in grievance adjustment pro-
cedures has been influenced in any way by the action of the National Mediation
Board in representation disputes. I am referring specifically to the results of the
Board's historical "craft or class" policies that have left large numbers of em-
ployees in this industry unrepresented, and whether this has had an effect on the
problem. I would like also to suggest a possibility for a constructive remedy in
this area based upon section 205 of the Act. That section contains a provision for
the establishment by the National Mediation Board of a National Air Transport
Adjustment Board. I would like to ask whether this might offer an appropriate
response to the problem faced by unrepresented employees? What I am suggesting
here is this: It may well be that we in this industry who have been talking and
dealing with the problems of represented employees also have an obligation to
provide a structure to which unrepresented employees in this industry can take
their grievances in the manner contemplated under section 204.
MR. SCHWARTZ: I think that unrepresented employees ought to get representa-
tion. I think that is the real answer. And I also think that whatever my views
may be that that is what Congress intended and that is why it uses language
such as Herbert just read to us. "Through representatives"; that is exactly what
Congress intended when it wrote the Railway Labor Act and that is what it
still intends. I agree, however, that the Act does give employees the right to bring
grievances. There are employees, unfortunately, who are not represented by unions
and they have rights to be considered. I think that there is no question but that
they must act or they should be required to act through the boards of adjust-
ments that are created by representatives. I think that the Act does not provide
for anything else. But aside from that I think there is an opportunity for em-
ployers, that is, for carriers, to engage in what might be considered interference
or anti-union activity if employees are able to go to management and get boards
selected by management themselves and get better treatment than employees who
have to go to representative boards. Whether that is going to happen in a particular
case I cannot say, but I do think that there are opportunities of claims of dis-
crimination and interference which ought not to exist. We now have the principle
which I talked about before, and which is very firmly established, that no matter
who the employee is, the union must furnish fair representation; and there is a
check on a union's abuse, if there is any, for employees. One possible answer I
suppose is a national board such as Herbert suggests, but certainly what we have
learned from the railroad industry would not prompt us to establish a national
board and I do not see why it would be any different on the airlines. I do not
think that the airline personnel, either management or union personnel, are any
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smarter or more efficient than the people on the railroads. I think they would run
into exactly the same problems. As a matter of fact, we now have systems
boards on the railroads. We have one, for example, on the Pennsylvania Railroad
which I happen to be involved in, which acts just like an airline system board.
And so long as we can stay away from the national board, we are in good shape.
Therefore, I do not think that the establishment of a national board for the air-
lines is going to be of any help in this situation.
MR. KAHN: I do feel that there is a need to redefine some appropriate units for
representation purposes. Perhaps some airline employee groups that might be con-
sidered appropriate units, let's say by the National Labor Relations Board under
some of its criteria, cannot function in that fashion at present. More broadly, I
agree with Asher Schwartz that if a group of employees do not choose to have
a representative and are not covered by a collective bargaining agreement and,
further, if they are not covered by individual contracts of employment, then ex-
cept for the general rights guaranteed to them by other laws-such as the right
not to be discriminated against because of race or because of union activity if
they are trying to create a union-the employer has a lot of unilateral authority
that may not be challenged. Most of the kinds of issues that can become griev-
ances under a collective bargaining agreement involve areas in which the em-
ployer has essentially unilateral authority unless the employees have a union.
MR. JAMES HIGHSAW: I am a partner in Mulholland, Hickey and Lyman in
Washington, D.C., and I'd like to direct a question either to Mr. Schwartz or
Mr. Hill or perhaps both of them. It has to do with the impact on the jurisdiction
of airline system boards of a case in which I was the losing attorney. The case
to which I refer is the decision of the Third Circuit in Brady v. TWA and IAM
last August. The Third Circuit held that an airline system board has no juris-
diction of a dispute arising under the union shop provisions of a collective bar-
gaining agreement because it said that such a dispute was not a dispute between
an employee and an air carrier, even though the air carrier was a party to the
agreement, but rather, a dispute between a union and an employee. If this de-
cision is read literally it means that all disputes on the interpretation and applica-
tion of union shop provisions of airline collective bargaining agreements will
have to be litigated in the courts. This is not a very encouraging prospect from
any point of view and particularly in light of the problem that has been discussed
concerning the time it takes to prosecute grievances. We have been talking here
about 30 to 45 days for system board decisions on grievances. Compare this to
the length of the Brady case. In this case the employee was discharged under the
agreement on 15 May 1956. He thereafter went into federal court and his case
was finally heard by the Supreme Court when it denied a petition for certiorai
on 15 January 1969, almost thirteen years later. He returned to work on or about
3 March. Now I would like to ask either one of these gentlemen, or perhaps both, if
they have given any thought to this and whether or not this unpleasant prospect
might be avoided by the revision of these agreements so as to provide for a sole
neutral arbitrator rather than the ordinary system board make-up which does
seem to have disturbed the courts in this particular area. There are such pro-
visions in all of the union shop agreements in the railroad industry and so far,
to my knowledge, this problem has not been litigated in that industry. I think
perhaps if the courts were confronted with this type of agreement rather than
the ordinary system board agreement that they had before them in the Brady
case they might reach a different result, but I would like to hear what Mr. Hill
or Mr. Schwartz has to say about this.
MR. SCHWARTZ: I agree with what Jim said at the end that had there been an
individual neutral instead of a board which was obviously hostile there might
have been a different result and it might have happened much sooner. On Ameri-
can Airlines, in the flight engineer agreement which Arthur Wisehart and I parti-
pated in drafting, we provided for a single neutral appointed by the American
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Arbitration Association in just such a situation in order to avoid this question
of having a hostile board which does disturb the courts and probably rightfully
so-sometimes more so than it should be. I would like to refer you to Cunningham
v. Erie in which TWU, not TWU but the predecessor to TWU, was taken to
task by the Court of Appeals in the Second Circuit because it refused to accept
dues from a union member when he sent his dues in three months late, where
there was some evidence in the record that the union in the past had accepted
dues from other members who were late, without going into the circumstances
of the other cases, because the circumstances were unknown to the union and
couldn't be proved. Now in the Brady case, I think Brady acted foolishly in the
first instance, and then the union followed it up by acting foolishly in the second
instance. I imagine that is what caused the delay. I do not think the delay arose
merely out of the kind of procedure that existed. They simply made it the kind
of case that was not going to be settled. Jim's first point was whether the board
has jurisdiction. I think that the board strained a bit to find, or rather the courts
strained a bit to find, that the board had no jurisdiction because it did not like the
board and decided that it was really a dispute between the employee and the
union which, therefore, was not covered under section 204 of the Railway Labor
Act. But the fact is, of course, that in Glover you had a similar situation which
has been decided quite recently. The courts said the same thing, only this time
they said that the employer could be brought into the suit on the basis of a charge
of unfair representation if the suit was against the union. Thus the courts are
brought into the picture with respect not only to disputes between unions and
their members, but also between employees and employers where the union is
involved on a charge of unfair representation. I think that this is necessary if
there is going to be fair treatment of all claims because as I said before, if you
examine the Arnold case, no matter what may have been done in that situation, the
fact still remains that the board was a hostile board. The majority of the pilots
controlled the union. They were going to decide whether or not these fellows
were entitled to seniority. It was their representative that was on that board. I
think that was an unfair result and the Court should have taken jurisdiction in
that kind of situation. Now if the board procedure can be so revised so as to
remove that hostility, then it will not be necessary for the courts to come into
the picture, and I think that would make them very happy.
MR. H-ILL: Jim, after the act permitted union shop agreements, we had some
discharge cases. And as conscious as I am about the board's jurisdiction, as should
be apparent from what I said this morning, it never occurred to me to question
the board's jurisdiction at all. It seems to me that it is an integral part of the
agreement and should be interpreted as such. We had two agreements-one with
the mechanics and one with the pilots. I think the remedy is to have, as I sug-
gested this morning, a board where the partisan members accept the neutral's
decision so that there can be no judicial attack on it. That was done in the
Arnold case. I see no reason why disputes concerning the meaning of the agree-
ment should get out of the board and into the courts. I think they belong in
the board. Sometimes we get unhappy with boards. I testified in a case in San
Francisco where a court refused to dismiss the case because of lack of jurisdiction.
The court heard it on the merits and I thought I was going to be fined for
contempt of court because after seeing the elaborate machinery and the mistakes
that were made that would not have been made by an experienced system board,
I told the judge that I thought our procedure was much better. So the protection
then would shield the board from attack and, thus, avoid going to court.
MR. JoHN O'KEEFE: My question is directed to Mr. Hill and Professor Kahn
in regard to grievance procedural steps before you reach the system board. Mr.
Schwartz commented that he felt only one step was necessary. Some of my experi-
ence has been that because an airline is diversified geographically they have some-
what of a central decision-making process. I would like a comment from Mr.
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Hill, concerning the purpose for the three steps he mentioned, and what each
step would accomplish.
MR. HILL: I am happy to try to answer that. After I told Asher Schwartz last
night that he started off this model business, he dropped in the hopper eight
paragraphs that covered the grievance procedure and the system board. And boy
we really fell for that. We went draft after draft before we abandoned it. But
I am not mad at Asher. I'm grateful to him because in the process I abandoned
many of my stereotyped responses that I cherished for so many, many years. Well,
in trying to figure out the steps, I came to the conclusion that it really "ain't"
nobody's business but the parties. There is no magical number. First, I disagree
with Asher. I think he oversimplified it. But I cannot see the reason for six steps
or five or even four. I just stop there. Perhaps you do not need three. The reason
I could defend three is two-fold: One, there has to be both a union and carrier
system-wide review because you are dealing now with system-wide agreements in
which uniformity is important. That uniformity of interpretation is terribly im-
portant to airlines and unions, and that may account for the number of cases
they take to the system board. Thus, I would say there is a need for, in addition
to the initial grievance, the system-wide review. I am satisfied that in the majority
of crafts or classes there is probably a need for an intermediate step because from
my own observation at that stage, a number of grievances in some crafts or
classes have been disposed of on the non-precedental basis. I think that should
be encouraged. That is why I do not believe in going to two steps in non-
disciplinary grievances or at least I would not recommend less than three. How-
ever, if the parties themselves think two are enough, two are fine. If they think
four are needed, I think that is fine. All I am saying, John, is for Pete's sake,
reexamine them. Do not just take what has been there before and continue it
forever and ever. I have seen some decisions in one particular craft or class where
there are four steps; there is a man who gets paid to go out and hear the third
step and he writes an elaborate decision; then another man gets paid to hold
another hearing and he writes an elaborate decision at the fourth step saying
exactly what the man said at the third step. That makes work. I do not like
to see anyone put out of a job but I think that we could use that money, that
time and that energy to speed up the grievance procedure and expedite their dis-
position in the system board. In short, I am not saying that there is any number.
I would not recommend any number as a magical number. I am not that smart
and I do not think anybody ought to try.
MR. KAHN: I think that the study of any particular bargaining unit by some-
one who is willing to take a fresh look at it would readily determine the right
number. I think it would tend to be the same or a smaller number of steps than
customarily exists. But the right number for the Air Line Dispatchers Associa-
tion might be smaller, because of the dispersion of its small membership and the
essential centralization of decision-making for this group, than for a machinist
at an over-haul base with 6,000 maintenance employees. I think there is a ten-
dency to have more steps than are useful. I want to call attention to Northwest
Airlines' 1966 pilot agreement. This airline and ALPA did revise their grievance
procedure considerably in 1966, and they said that for a case where a pilot is
disciplined or dismissed, his written request for "an investigation and hearing"-
that is an awful phrase-goes directly to that company's vice-president for flight
operations; and, if denied by this vice-president, will go to the system board.
Now that is probably the right number of steps for pilot discipline and discharge
cases at Northwest because they have discovered, I assume, that any earlier step
has been perfunctory. Since the buck will be passed up to the vice-president any-
way, let's get it there fast. On the other hand, for pilot grievances on non-
disciplinary issues at Northwest, they have kept one additional step. My point is
simply that they took a new look at their old practices and said: "How many
steps are needed for different kinds of grievances?" And they amended their
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agreement. General Motors has about 130 plants under its single, master agree-
ment with the UAW. The top step is at the level of the corporation and the
international union. Before that top step, there are only two. Step one is on the
shop floor and step two is the plant. Step three is the corporation and step four
is the umpire. That setup seems to meet their needs efficiently. If I am not mis-
taken, GM and the UAW used to have at least one if not two additional steps
which, after some experience, they decided to eliminate.
MR. DANIEL KORNBLUM: I am a practicing attorney in New York. I direct
my question to Mr. Hill. Am I correct in my understanding, Mr. Hill, that it is
your position that "due process of law" standards should not apply at any but
terminal steps in the grievance procedure? And if so, are you not ignoring
established precedents under, for example, the National Labor Relations Act, as
well as the trend toward extension of the "Bill of Rights" to labor relations?
MR. HILL: I might have overlooked or ignored a great number of things. I
am saying that for years the National Railroad Adjustment Board said that rail-
road agreements guaranteed constitutional due process in a fair and impartial
hearing. There were hundreds, literally hundreds of decisions saying that. So
many that a study was made by Mr. Lazar published under the direction of Ben
Aaron. It seems to me that to try to guarantee to me that if I get fired I will
receive constitutional due process in a completely impartial hearing by the em-
ployer that fired me is asking too much. It is asking too much of that employer.
But I hope that employees will be objective and fair. If I get reinstated, I could
not care less whether I got constitutional due process. If I do not get reinstated,
I do not think I have a right to it in the grievance procedure. I think the place
that the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit said I am entitled to it is in the
system board. I can just go right through the grievance procedure. So I was happy
to see the case of Rosenberg v. Eastern Airlines decided by the Fifth Circuit. The
use of this line is garbage for the railroad agreements would not load or burden
down the grievance procedure. It seems to me that some fellow who is not a lawyer
would not know due process from a bale of hay. Lazar in his book calls the
union and management representatives hearing the grievances ministers of justice.
I do not think we want union representatives or carrier representatives or people
hearing grievances to be called ministers of justice. As far as the Railway Labor
Act is concerned, I am satisfied that they are not entitled to it and from an
ethical standpoint, I do not think we should be concerned about it because the
remedy is at the system board level where the employee is guaranteed due process.
I would much rather have a fast procedure. Then if the employee or the union is
not satisfied, give it to the system board.
MR. LEVY: I have some comments about the state of the injunction law to
which Asher Schwartz referred particularly when he talked about the Westchester
Lodge case. I think that there is an anomaly in the law right now, and I would
like to see if the panel agrees. I think that the state of the law gives a distinct
advantage in a minor dispute situation to a union that is willing to threaten to
strike in support of its position on a grievance. As I understand the law, and I
think Asher agrees, based upon the statements he made, the courts will refuse to
grant a union plaintiff an injunction to preserve the status quo as in Chicago
River. But the courts will often grant status quo relief to the union when it is
a defendant in a Chicago River type action. And that suggests to me that the
policy of the law in this area is to encourage threats by labor organizations to
strike as a means of obtaining status quo relief through the courts. Now I have
heard airline management counsel say from time to time that a threat to strike
in this industry sometimes can be nearly as damaging as the strike itself. I would
like to ask if the panel has any comment as to whether the law is moving in the
wrong direction in this area. But one further comment and that is that in this
same connection, I perceive that the law is moving closer to status quo preserva-
tion in all situations where a procedure for orderly settlement of a dispute is
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available. I think that Judge Bryan's recent opinion in New York in the Pan
American case may be indicative of that movement, and I think also that the
logical next step in injunction law in this area will be to give a union-plaintiff
status quo relief in appropriate situations on a selective basis in minor disputes.
I would like to hear any comment from the panel.
CHAIRMAN CHARLES MORRIS: Asher and John both had comments in their
principle papers on that subject. I suppose they still have the same views. Mark,
would you want to comment or would either one of you want to add to what
you have said before. We have perhaps a difference of opinion between the two,
but certainly a difference between at least two circuits. You might want to direct
your attention to the scope of judicial review which was discussed in the Jack
Kroner paper, the possibility of a different standard of review developing under
the Railway Labor Act or under Title 2 of the Railway Labor Act and the
"Trilogy" cases under the National Labor Relations Act, section 301. These are
interesting questions; does anyone care to explore them further?
MR. JOHN HARPER: I will make just one short comment. Most of our practice,
at least in Texas, is under section 301. I am not necessarily always pleased with
the standards used by the Fifth Circuit in this area under section 301. I some-
times feel the courts are dealing in judicial abdication rather than any limited form
of judicial review. But be that as it may, the parties have contracted for final
and binding decisions through system boards in lieu of strikes and other self-help.
And in view of that, as long as there is some limited review to avoid the grossest
of decisions by an arbitrator, I feel that section 301 or the standards under Title
I, which amount to essentially the same thing, will, if you have really been rooked,
allow you to obtain judicial relief, although I have read cases by our eminent
speaker last night where the company got rooked and did not get judicial relief
because there was some "arguable basis" to support the award in the contract,
to wit: The contract set forth a work week and a pay week and the company
changed the pay week, and the essence of the award was that the employees were
entitled to two full weeks' pay for a week and two days of work. So, you know
all this panacea about judicial review? Do not get carried away with it because
it is not as much as it is made out to be.
MR. KAHN: In this extremely dynamic and progressive industry that we've
been involved with here, it is remarkable how much inertia there can be on making
changes in various kinds of procedures. This Northwest Airlines pilot contract
did institute some significant changes in the grievance procedure for which I just
said they ought to be congratulated. And incidentally, there is another novel
feature in that contract. It says that at the election of the Association, the sys-
tem board of adjustment will consist of only three members, one appointed by
the company, one by the association and one by the neutral. It also goes on to
say that when the company and association agree, a combination of cases may be
presented to a neutral member. This can be a significant economy and, of course,
makes a lot of sense for a group of related cases. But I want to read you another
phrase from this Northwest agreement, one you've probably heard a thousand
times: "A pilot shall not be disciplined or dismissed from the Company without
notification in writing from the Company as to any such action and such pilot
shall not be disciplined or dismissed without an investigation or hearing, provided
that the pilot makes written request for an investigation and hearing within ten
days after receiving said notification." Now I think that is poor language. I would
like to see a provision which says that a pilot shall not be disciplined or dismissed
by the company without just cause. And then a provision which provides the
right of the pilot to contest that action through the grievance procedure. I would
hope that a company has investigated the case before it disciplines or discharges
a pilot. If it has not, that fact will become painfully aware to both parties during
the grievance procedure. I asked a management man at Northwest why they did
not change that old language which dates back to the first American pilot con-
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tract. And the management man said: "We did not propose changing that bad
language because we thought the union might be suspicious of our motives, and,
since the language really has not done us any harm, and we wanted to work on
other changes that were more substantive, we just let it alone." And that is one
of the problems. One final comment. A grievance procedure is a system. It should be
designed or revised as a system; for example, what resources would it take and what
procedures and costs would be involved to get answers to most grievances within
three months. If both parties went at it with the objective of rational and sensible
answers within three months, they could readily design a system that would
achieve it. It might, of course, cost more than they had expected. But this is
what has usually not been done, and what I would now urge the parties to con-
sider.
MR. SCHWARTZ: I made mention of the fact that the Chicago River case revo-
lutionized labor relations, and I still stand by that. As a union officer, I would
very much regret Chicago River and urge its overruling or change by statutory
action so that we can go back to enforcing our contract by a threat of a strike,
and a strike without fear of injunction. It was proved to be very effective in the
past and I know it is very effective in other industries where they do not have
the provisions of the Railway Labor Act. It could be effective with us too. As
a lawyer, however, as well as a participant in the labor processing machinery, I
would not urge that. I would prefer that we not go back to the technique of
strikes or threatening strikes or slow-downs or other drawbacks. But I think
that in order for us to justify that position to the union leaders they have got
to be assured and convinced that the alternative is a reasonable one. By and large
John Hill takes a rather progressive point of view. I think many others in this
industry do, too. But on the other hand, I think they sometimes go overboard
and resist the pressures of the union to try and make the alternative a reasonable
one. Despite the pious words that are expressed about delays, the fact is there
are delays and not as much is done to avoid them as could be done. A question
was raised here by Professor Kroner as to whether or not the 1966 amendment
of the Railway Labor Act is applicable to the airlines. Section 3 was the only
section amended by Congress in 1966. And if you read section 204 which pro-
vided for the application of the machinery to the airlines, it specifically exempts
section 3. This was done back in 1934. Now when Congress amended section 3,
they apparently lost track of this exemption in section 204. So an argument can
be made that the amendment of section 3 is inapplicable to the airlines. That
argument is being made and has been made by the airlines. Now there is a de-
cision on a grievance at Eastern Airlines-it is just a district court decision-in
1967 specifically on that point and upholding the contention that the changes in
the Act made in section 3 are applicable to the airlines. There is a long rationale
in it. I think some of it is sound and some of it is not sound. But the result I
think is sound because it would be absurd in my judgment for us to say that
the scope of judicial review of an arbitrator's award under the same machinery
provided for in the Act, and for the same purposes, is different when there is a
refusal to comply with the arbitrator's award in an airline dispute and one in a
railroad dispute. It is the intention of Congress to make them pretty much the
same and I do not think that the difference between having a national board as
against a system board makes that much of a difference. As I said before, the rail-
ways now do have system boards. I think the industry ought to forego their oppo-
sition. They ought to go back to Congress and say, "look you made a mistake; now
look at it and pass another amendment so that what you intended to do will be
clearly applicable to the airlines as well as to the railroads." I think if they did
that, Congress would do it. I also think that it is a mistake for the carriers to
press hard on the point that the board has no jurisdiction to issue an injunction
to maintain the status quo in a minor dispute pending the grievance machinery.
I think they ought to agree that there is such a jurisdiction on the part of the
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court. What they ought to concentrate on is to persuade the court that it is not
necessary or equitable that an injunction be issued. Concentrate on the merits of
the dispute rather than the question of the jurisdiction of the board. I think they
ought to adopt the rationale of the Westcbester Lodge case. It is a sensible one
and it is one which is consistent with the original purpose of the Act rather than
that in the Hilbert case in the Fifth or Seventh Circuit. Now if that were done,
I think that unions could reasonably be expected to accept the proposition that
they do not go out on strike or threaten strike when they have a minor dispute,
because in fact they have a reasonable alternative, not only to decide the merits of
the disputes, but also to make sure they get justice during the course of it.
End of Thursday morning discussion.
